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Abstract:  This paper studies the dynamics of three developing country labor markets 
employing recent advances in the estimation of  continuous time Markov processes.  We 
first examine the flows of workers among five states: three types of paid labor, 
unemployment, and out of the labor force.   We find a high degree of commonality in 
patterns of worker flows among the three countries and attempt to compare the flexibility 
of the markets by examining an index of overall “mobility.” Second, we seek to establish 
whether the issues of advanced country labor markets apply to LDC markets or whether 
the latter constitute a different phylum.  Paralleling the mainstream literature on the role 
of being out of the labor force as discouraged unemployment, we then identify some 
common stylized facts about the role of the informal self-employed and salaried sectors 
and to what degree they serve as a holding pattern vs a desirable alternative to formal 
sector work.  In the process, we identify very strong differences in mobility patterns 
between men and women and attempt to shed some light on whether these differences 
arise from discrimination or perhaps instead the constraints imposed by household 
responsibilities. Finally, we study labor market adjustment across the business cycle in 
Mexico and identify patterns of job creation and destruction among the three paid sectors 
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This paper employs recent advances in the estimation of continuous time Markov 
processes to study the dynamics of three Latin American labor markets.  The goal is two 
fold.  First, we use the average transition matrices and derivative statistics to identify 
common patterns and establish some stylized facts about labor force dynamics in the 
developing world.
1  Second, we seek to establish whether the issues preoccupying the 
mainstream literature resonate in the developing world, or whether we are dealing with a 
different phylum of labor markets, altogether.  To this end, we complement the average 
matrices with a time series of instantaneous matrices that depicts the adjustment of the 
Mexican labor market across the business cycle.  
 
As a central issue in the second agenda, the industrialized world has examined in 
some detail the relative roles of the states of unemployment and being out of the labor 
force (OLF) particularly in the context of adjustments during cyclical downturns.   
Although theoretically the differences between two worker states may be clear- modern 
matching theory treats it as something of an unpaid chosen state not given to search- the 
existence of non-negligible flows of workers directly from out of the labor force into 
employment raises suspicions that OLF may be comprised in fact of the discouraged 
unemployed.  However, Flinn and Heckman (1982), pioneering the use of Markov 
processes in this field, conclude that, for young men in the US, the two states show very 
different behavior and Blanchard and Diamond (1989) confirm the distinction finding 
countercyclical flows from employment to unemployment and procyclical flows into 
OLF.  
 
Developing country labor markets, in addition to having a substantial OLF sector,  
feature a similar and long standing ambiguity in the presence of the large “informal” 
sectors comprised of owners of or workers in small firms who are uncovered by labor 
legislation.
 Dating at least from Harris and Todaro (1973), the sector has been equated 
                                                 
1 See Maloney (1999) for an early application of descrete time transition matrices to Mexico.   2
with underemployment or disguised unemployment- the disadvantage sector of a market 
segmented by rigidities in the “formal” or covered sector of the economy.  However, 
another emerging view keys more off the mainstream self-employment literature in the 
style of Lucas (1978), Jovanovic 1982 and Evans and Leighton 1989, and argues that, as 
a first approximation, the sector should be seen as an unregulated, largely voluntary self-
employed sector.  The exaggerated size of the informal sector in LDCs, raises the stakes 
surrounding the debate dramatically:  If the 35%-50% of Latin American labor markets is 
thought of as disguised unemployed, then the distortions are indeed large.  The two views 
are, of course, compatible to some degree given the heterogeneity of the sector, and 
existing theory can accommodate this: a turnover based efficiency wage model such as 
that of Stiglitz (1974) allows for firms raising wages above market clearing to deter 
workers from entering self-employment and, in the process, creating involuntary 
informality. As with the OLF/unemployment case, the issue is really one of degree: what 
the “stylized” view of the functioning of the sector should be.  
 
A second US literature is concerned with understanding the high rates of job 
creation and destruction that map into large flows of workers in and out of employment, 
and how these combine to form the overall aggregates generally studied (See Blanchard 
and Diamond 1989 and Davis and Haltiwanger 1998).  The central lesson emerging from 
this literature is that the cyclical behavior of unemployment is mainly driven by job 
destruction in downturns and a reduction in destruction in upturns.  This higher volatility 
of the job destruction rate found in the data, has inspired theoretical search modes such as 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), which have now become standard in the literature.   
This issue clearly takes on another dimension in developing countries when we introduce 
informal sectors.  Extrapolating the segmented market view, the sector would be called 
on to create (substandard) positions when job destruction rises in the formal sector and do 
the reverse in upturns.  A voluntary, unregulated micro enterprise view where the sector 
is generally integrated with the formal salaried sector might suggest patterns of 
comovement in job creation and destruction.   
   3
To begin, we generate maps of the intensity of worker transitions among labor 
market states (instantaneous probabilities of movement) which can then be decomposed 
into the duration of stay in a given state, and the predisposition to move to a different 
state conditional on separation from the sector of origin.  Each statistic offers insight into 
the nature of the transition process.  Looking at average transition matrices for each 
country, we establish the basic similarities of the labor market dynamics in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico and characterize their relative dynamism by an index of overall 
“mobility.”  Second, we examine the patterns of entry into and exit from  unemployment, 
and OLF and extend the analysis to the  informal self-employed and salaried sectors.  We 
then examine the Mexican case in more detail, creating a series of instantaneous 
transition matrices from 1987 to 2002, a period that covers a recovery from recession and 
boom, the lead up and occurrence of the peso crisis, and then the subsequent recovery.   
 
We find that, as in the US literature, being out of the labor force and unemployed 
are fundamentally different states.  We also find suggestive evidence that, unlike the US, 
recessions are characterized by reduced job creation, not job destruction. While not 
conclusive, the stylized facts surrounding the informal sector appear consistent with those 
emerging from the small firm sector in the US and hence suggestive similarities, despite 
the differences in sector size.  In particular, the sector shares the same patterns of job 
destruction and creation as the formal sector and in fact contributes more to 
unemployment than the formal sector and direct flows from the formal sector into the 
informal sector do not increase during downturns. Further, the self-employed sector 
behaves as a desirable alternative to formal employment, showing a relative expansion 
during upturns.   However, the informal sectors show much faster rates of job creation 
than formal employment does meaning that they disproportionately absorb flows from 




As Fougère and Kamionka (1992) note, an earlier generation of studies focused 
on estimating transition probabilities between two periods of time in the context of a   4
discrete time Markov chain.
2 More recent work, including theirs for France and 
Kalbfleish and Lawless (1985) seek to use discrete panel data to estimate the transition 
intensities from an underlying continuous Markov process. This has several advantages. 
First, as pointed out by Singer and Spilerman (1973), the natural time scale for many 
mobility processes is not a discrete sequence of intervals such as generations or decades 
but a continuum of time points. Labor status mobility can be viewed more realistically as 
a process in which states changes occur at random time points, and probabilities of moves 
between particular states are governed by Markov transition matrices. Secondly, as 
suggested by Fougère and Kamionka (2003), the analysts has access to individual panel 
data, which , in general, do not provide observations of continuous labor market histories, 
and they do not allow to identify directly measures of duration of individual employment 
and unemployment spells, or the probability to become unemployed at the end of an 
employment spell. 
 
One way to draw statistical inference of such parameters is to assume that the 
observed discrete-time mobility process is generated by a continuous-time homogeneous 
Markov process.  We assume a homogenous Markov process Xt defined over a discrete 
state-space E ={1,….K} where K is the number of possible states (job sectors) a worker 
could be found in.  The worker if observed at equally distanced points of time. With that 
information one can construct a discrete time transition matrix P(t,t+n) where 
 
i t X j n t X n t t pij = = + = + ) ( | ) ( Pr( ) , ( f o r   ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 = t and ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 = n  
 
The interpretation of  ij p is simply,  the probability of moving from state i to state j in one 
step (n). Discrete time matrices are easily straight forward to compute as the maximun 
likelihood estimator for  ij p  is  i ij ij n n p / = , being  ij n the total number of transitions from 
state i to state j and  i n the total number of observations initially in state i. As   0 → n , this 
gives rise to a kxk transition intensity matrix Q where 
                                                 
2 Notable examples of such estimates of labor market transitions would include Hall (1972), Toikka (1976), 
Clark and Summers (1979) Akerlof and Main (1980) and Poterba and Summers (1986) for the US.  See 











whose solution is given by: 
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Thus,  ij q  elements can be interpreted as the instantaneous rates of transition from 
state i to state j. These must be seen as reduced form estimates combining both the 
disposition of workers to move to a different state as well as the available “spaces” in that 
state: a workers desire to take a certain job and the availability of that job,  quits and fires 
etc. As we will see below, this to some degree limits their power to illuminate the forces 
behind the observed labor force dynamics. 
 
In practice, the estimation of the continuous time transition matrix from is subject 
to two major difficulties.  First of all, solution to equation 2 may not be unique. This is 
known as the aliasing problem.  That is, it is possible for an observed discrete time matrix 
to have been generated by more than one underlying continuous matrix. On the other 
hand it is possible that none of the solutions obtained for Q is compatible with the 
theoretical model expressed in equation 1 where the elements of Q have to satisfy a set of 
restrictions showed in equation 3. This is known as the embeddability problem.  
   6
Two main approaches have been followed by the literature to estimate the Q 
matrix and draw statistical inference
3. Kalbfleisch and Lawless’s (1985) maximum 
likelihood procedure to estimate the elements of Q using a quasi-Newton or scoring 
algorithm. The main drawback of this approach stems from the fact that if P is not 
embeddable, then inference using the maximum likelihood is not reliable as standard 
asymptotic theory does not longer apply
4.  
 
Geweke et all (1986), propose a Bayesian procedure for statistical inference on 
intensity matrices as well as any function of the estimated parameters by using a uniform 
diffuse prior which allows to establish the probability of embeddability of the discrete-
time matrix.  Roughly speaking, the method consists of drawing a large number of 
discrete time matrices from a previously defined “importance function”, assessing their 
embeddability and constructing confidence intervals of the parameters or functions of 
interests using only the posterior distribution of those matrices that turn out to be 
embeddable.  This also provides a very natural way of assessing the probability of 
embeddability as the proportion of the embeddable draws. We have follow this approach, 
which has also been employed in Fougère and Kamionka (1992 a,b,c) 
 
For interpretational issues, however it is very convenient to decompose the 
intensity matrix Q into two more manageable indicators: rate of separation and propensity 
























































Where elements  ii ij ij q q r / − = for  j i ≠ and  K i ,..., 1 = which has the natural interpretation 
of the probability of a move from state i  to state j  given separation.  This provides 
measures of transition probabilities conditional on the general rate of turnover in the 
                                                 
3 For an excellent overview of this topic see Fougère and Kamionka (1992a) 
4 The reader is again referred to Fougère and Kamionka (1992a).  For an earlier very preliminary paper 
estimating continuous time matrices for Mexico and Argentina using this technique see Arango and 
Maloney (2000a).   7
sector.  This can be interpreted as “if all workers were to leave their initial sector at the 
same rate, what would be the probability of ending in each sector.”  Broadly speaking, 
this can be considered a measure of tendency or predisposition. Therefore, throughout the 
paper we will refer to  ij r elements as the propensity matrix.  This is especially meaningful 
when comparing rates of transition for different groups of the populations. For instance, 
the intensity of transition  into sector j from sector i may be higher for group h than for 
group g, 
) ( ) ( g
ij
h
ij q q > ,but this may only imply that more type h workers leave sector i at 
any instant than workers type g. If we seek to understand the predisposition of a moving 
worker to enter one sector relative to another, we need to compensate for turnover.  
 
Additional useful inferences can be obtained from estimation of the intensity 
matrix. For instance, duration times in state i can be shown to be distributed 
exponentially  
) exp( ~ ii i q d − , 
 allowing us to retrieve the mean duration time en each sector as  
1 ) (
− − = ii i q d E  
 
Finally, we employ an overall measure of mobility of the intensity matrix to 
assess the can be computed following Geweke, Marshall and Zarkin (1986) who extend 
the work of Shorrocks (1978) in the construction of mobility indices in discrete time to 
continuous time models. This index satisfies a series of desirable properties such as 
monotonicity, strong immobility , velocity and freedom from aliasing see (Geweke 1986) 
It takes the form of 
 




In order to construct the time continuous matrices we employ three different 
surveys which compile information about labor status of workers and other relevant   8
information.  We employ one year as the time unit to analyze labor mobility dynamics, 
mainly as a common sampling interval for the three countries.  
 
Mexico 
The Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU National Urban Employment 
Survey) conducts extensive quarterly household interviews in the 16 major metropolitan 
areas. The questionnaire is extensive in its coverage of participation in the labor market, 
wages, hours worked, etc. that are traditionally found in such employment surveys.  The 
ENEU is structured so as to track a fifth of each sample across a five quarter period. We 
have concatenated panels from the first quarter of 1987 to the forth quarter of 1999. For 
each individual contributed with tow transition pairs (from 1
st quarter to the forth and 
second to the fifth.) giving rise to approximately 1.785.000 transitions, 810.000 for men 
and 975.000 for women. 
  
Argentina 
In a similar fashion for Argentina, we use the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
(EPH Permanent Household Survey) a panel covering the area of the Federal District and 
surroundings (Gran Buenos Aires), which accounts for approximately 60% of total 
Argentina employment. The survey is conducted every 6 months (April/May and 
October) with a 25% rotation of the panel. As a consequence, each household is followed 
for two years at sampling intervals of six months. We employ panels from May 1993 to 
October 2001. The sample is notably smaller than the Mexican and Brazilian surveys and 
we can only study 29.000 transitions, 13.900 for men and 15.100 for women. 
 
Brazil 
The Pesquisa Mensual do Emprego (PME- Monthly Employment Survey) follows 
monthly employment indicators. Households are interview four months in a row, re-
interviewing them eight moths gap. 25% of the sample is renewed every month Given 
this panel structure we can construct four yearly employment status transitions for each 
individual. We have put together 9 consecutive panels starting in February 1982. Each 
panel consists of 12 consecutive cohorts covering approximately 2 years covering the   9
period 1982-2001. The number of transitions available are 2.520.000 in total,  1.190.000 




We divide the labor force into three sectors of  work: formal salaried, informal 
salaried and self-employed. While the term "informal" suffers from overly broad and 
imprecise usage, it refers here to  owners (Self-Employed) and workers (Informal 
Salaried) in firms under 16 employees who do not have social security or medical 
benefits and are therefore not protected.  Formal salaried workers are defined as those 
enjoying labor protections. We drop those falling in the category of unprotected workers  
in large firms,. The remainder of the sample is divided into two groups those out of the 
labor force, and the unemployed
5.  
 
The sample was further divided into two education groups, those with 8 or less 
years of education  (Low Education) and those with  more than 8 years (High Education)  
as well as  three age group:  less than 24 years of age, 24 to 40, and then above 40. We 
follow Kamionka and Fougere in assuming time homogeneity within each age class but 
not necessarily across age classes.  That is, we hypothesis that  if t is the calendar time, 
and a the age of the individual,  m ij ij ii q a q a t q , ) ( ) , ( = =  where m corresponds to each of 
our sub-divisions of the sample.  Table 1 retrieves the summary of the population 
distribution among different sectors split according to age and education. 
 
IV. Patterns of Mobility 
 
  We estimate continuous time matrices from the discrete transition data as 
described above.  Table 2 reports the posterior probability of embeddability and suggests 
that the Brazilian and Mexican matrices are clearly embeddable for all different 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, the Brazilian survey lacks the information on firm size and informal status is simply given 
by whether the worker holds a signed work card or not, which guarantees access to benefits in Brazil. 
Mexican and Argentinean surveys contain very similar questions about benefits and firm sizes.   10
subgroups. Argentina, however, shows probabilities near unity for the overall matrix and 
runs into problems when the division of the sample reduces the number of observation.  
 
Tables 3a-c present the estimated Q matrices of intensities-the instantaneous 
probability of moving from sector i to j, and its two component parts, the rate of 
separation from the each sector, transformed into the mean duration of stay in the sector, 
and the matrix of propensities to move from i to j conditional on separation from the 
previous state.  The Q matrices suggest that the three labor markets are broadly of the 
same phylum, showing a high degree of commonality in most any arbitrarily chosen 
transition.  Argentina does differ in some key aspects that seem especially related to the 
very high rates of unemployment as we discuss below.  Hence, were we to study the 
markets at the same point in the business cycle, even greater commonalities may emerge.   
 
Going deeper and breaking apart the transition probabilities into turnover and 
propensity matrices, a number of common features strongly emerge from the three 
datasets which we now discuss.   
 
a. Labor Market Mobility/Flexibility 
 
The rate of turnover has been used as one benchmark of labor market flexibility 
(see for example Nickell 1997).  The overall mobility of workers through the matrix may 
thus provide a more comprehensive measure. Table 4 presents the Geweke, Marshall and 
Zarkin (1986) mobility index for the three countries, by country, gender age and 
educational group.  Argentina emerges as the country with the least mobility for all 
groups with Mexico and Brazil more or less similar to each other, Mexico only  slightly 
more mobile in most of the subgroups.  Since higher education or age may lead to higher 
levels of firm specific capital and attachment, we present the indexes disaggregated by 
both with age and education to see if the overall index is simply reflecting Argentina’s 
more educated and older population.  The Argentine matrix still appears “slower” even 
controlling for these demographic characteristics.  
   11
Since the mobility index is, effectively, the average mobility across all sectors, it 
may be that the results are being driven by one extreme sector.  Figure 1 plots the 
absolute mean duration of stay in each sector.  Again, as with the intensity matrices 
discussed above, the similarities are far more striking than the differences.  Particularly 
notable are the common patterns of relative durations across countries: shortest in 
unemployment followed by informal salaried, self-employment or out of the labor force 
and then longest in formal salaried employment.  But differences there are.  Brazil shows 
higher durations than Argentina in self- employment, informal salaried work and OLF, 
and Mexico shows higher durations in self-employment.  As is perhaps expected given its 
history of energetic unions and restrictive labor codes, Argentina shows high durations in 
the formal sector.   However, the fact that Brazil has only slightly lower formal sector 
durations makes the stylized impression of the Argentine market as especially over-
regulated perhaps harder to sustain.  In fact, what the mobility index appears to be 
picking up is the influence of  the very depressed labor market across this period that 
have led to a far higher duration of stay in unemployment before finding another job than 
in the other countries.   
 
b. Transitions Among Sectors 
 
OLF and Unemployment 
 
The propensity matrices cast suggest that, similar to the US, OLF has more 
complex function than simply discouraged unemployment. In both Mexico and Brazil, 
workers are more likely to move directly from OLF into employment than to pass 
through a period of search in unemployment.  The reverse movements tell something of a 
mixed story for men. Transitions into OLF from work are low- under 15%- and for 
Argentina and Mexico, propensities from unemployment are perhaps double that 
suggesting a flow of discouraged workers. On the other hand, the unemployed in Brazil 
unemployment show a lower propensity than most paid sectors to be a source of flows 
into OLF.  Thus, the male transitions offer a murky story on the role of the sector and 
firmer conclusions must for the more convincing evidence from business cycle analysis.  
However, two very striking facts emerge which merit attention. 
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First, in striking contrast to the men, in Mexico and Brazil, the propensity of 
women to move from self employment to OLF is  very high, .69 and .73 percent 
respectively (over four times higher than for males), and the reverse flows are higher than 
to any sector of work.  On average, women show far longer spells in OLF than men: 
twice as long in Mexico, 45% longer in Brazil, and 25% more in Argentina and shorter 
spells in self-employment 55% less in Brazil, 47% less in Mexico and 38% less in 
Argentina.  The rapid transitions between these two sectors largely explains the fact the 
higher mobility indexes for women than for men.  Finally, women show a lower 
propensity to transit to the self-employment sector from the formal, and informal  sectors 
and unemployment.  There is clearly a particular relationship between self-employment 
and OLF.  We return to both observations in the next sections.  
 
Second, Argentina appears to present a special case where almost 65% of men 
leaving OLF go into unemployment, a number triple the other countries for both genders. 





Figure 4 suggest that the informal self-employed behave quite similarly their first 
world colleagues and rather less like those in a queue for good formal sector jobs.  Evans 
and Jovanovic argued that the observed increasing probability of entry with age, despite a 
presumably lower level of risk aversion among the young, was consistent with the 
existence of credit constraints.  Strikingly consistent with this view, in all three countries 
the probability of entry for young workers from OLF or unemployment is a mere fraction 
of that for older workers.  This, the largest segment of informality in most countries (see 
table 1), is not a port of entry into work.  Less than 10% of young workers (16-24) 
leaving the OLF sector and unemployment choose self-employment as their entry point in 
the labor market, around 3 times less than the next age segment (24-40). Further, the 
propensity to enter the sector from informal or formal salaried work is also, in all cases, 
often over double for older workers than for younger workers.  For instance, 35% (20%)   13
of younger Mexican workers leaving the informal (formal) salaried sector start a business 
compared with the 57% (44%) of their immediately older counterparts. Similar results are 
found in Argentina and Brazil where roughly 20% (10%) of exiting young informal 
(formal) workers find a self-employment opportunity compared to 40% (20%) of older 
workers self-employment.  Generally speaking, the transition patterns are consistent with 
a life cycle model where, in an environment of weak education systems and credit 
markets, workers may enter formal employment to accumulate both human and financial 
capital, and then open their business 
 
Figure 3 also suggests that older and better educated workers spend longer spells 
in self-employment.  This would be consistent with the mainstream firm dynamics 
literature that suggests that young firms, which, ceteris paribus are more likely to be 
opened by young workers, have very high failure rates (see Jovanovic 1982 and Evans 
and Leighton 1989).  The pattern of tenure increasing for more educated workers is 
similar to that found in the formal sector and the opposite of that found in the informal 
salaried sector for informal workers. 
 
It may be argued that both the pattern of late entry and longer duration with age 
are also consistent with the idea that after middle age, a worker who loses his formal 
sector job will not be able to find a new one and hence is forced into self employment.  
But two features of the matrices mitigate against this view as being the entire or even a 
large part of the story. First, the rate of transition into the sector in all three countries 
seems broadly linear in age up until middle age. That is we do not see a sudden spike in 
propensities among old workers, but rather a gradual increase with something of a 
inflection point at prime age, when the propensity to enter often  begins to decrease.  This 
patterns seems more consistent with a prime age worker having accumulated sufficient 
human and physical capital than with the older workers being less and less likely to 
access the formal sector market once fired.   
 
Both the sociological literature and economic data offers reasons why poorer 
workers might prefer self employment over salaried work.  In both Mexico and Brazil,   14
motivation questions attached to the surveys used here reveal a preference for 
independence and higher levels of income among entrants consistent with Blanchflower 
and Oswald’s (1998) findings for the US, UK and Germany.
6  The flexibility afforded by 
self employment may also explain the especially dynamic corridor between self 
employment and self-employment found among women.  In a view with lineage to 
Becker’s (1991) work stressing structural determinants of employment patterns, 
Cunningham (1996) argues that Mexican womens’ patterns of participation, and 
particularly their gravitation toward self employment are driven by their need to balance 
their other responsibilities in the household: child raising requires a greater job flexibility 
than the salaried sectors offers.  
 
If this were the case, rather than an alternate model that women are discriminated 
against and hence are forced into informality, then we might expect that single women 
would show similar mobility patterns to men.  Table 6 extracts a cohort of single women 
for the two surveys with a marital status variable, Argentina and Mexico.  The intensity 
matrices of single women now have become very similar to those of men and this 
similarity holds up when disaggregated by duration and propensity.  Most of the 
difference in OLF duration can be explained by marital status. In fact Argentine single 
women now spend less time OLF than men do. Similarly, Mexican single women spend  
3.13 years in OLF instead of 5.1 for their gender overall, far closer to the mean spell of 
men, 2.57.  We also now find that the propensities to transition into OLF from every 
sector are also significantly reduced and that transitions from OLF into self-employment 
are equal or slightly below men for both countries. In other dimensions, single women 
appear to have largely standard male labor market patterns.  In both countries, they 
appear to enter from OLF into search and directly into formal salaried employment at the 
same rates as men and from unemployment they enter with propensities as high or higher 
than men.  It seems plausible that the exaggerated OLF-self-employment dynamic is 
                                                 
6 In Mexico, a linkable micro enterprise survey reveals that around two-thirdsof workers entering self 
employment from the formal salaried sector cited either more flexibility or higher earnings as the reasons.  
The Brazilian survey use here, over 62%of self-employed workest stated that they did not want a formal 
sector position, primarily because they were happy with their current job.    15
largely driven by periodic child bearing related shocks and the subsequent need for 
flexibility to manage family responsibilities. 
 
In sum, the dynamics of the sector are broadly consistent with those found for the 




Informal salaried workers are often seen as the more disadvantaged workers in 
LDC labor markets.  Table 2 and Figure 2 suggests however, that sector is very particular 
in heavily weighted toward the young.  We find, that, in contrast to self employment, 
entry into the sector decreases with age from either unemployment or OLF suggesting 
that it may, in fact, be a port of entry into the labor force.  
 
The very high propensities for Argentine workers to enter unemployment from 
OLF rather than enter directly into work and, in the Brazilian case, especially informal 
salaried work raises the question of why, in an economy of high unemployment, the 
informal sector is not absorbing unemployed workers as Harris and Todaro imagined. 
One possibility suggested by Maloney and Nuñez (2003), is that some formal sector 
rigidities, in particular the minimum wage, are very binding even or especially in the 
informal sector in Argentina and hence the market cannot clear there either.  Again, the 
breakdown by skill level does not suggest that this is due to Argentina’s more skilled 
work force preferring unemployment to a poor job match in the informal sector. 
 
More generally, the informal sectors seem to contribute as much to 
unemployment as being a substitute for it. If informality were the refuge for displaced 
workers who could not afford to be unemployed, we might expect few transitions 
between the two states-that is they would behave more like substitutes and one would 
leave formal sector employment into one or the other. But in all three countries, a very 
strong tendency exists for the informal self-employed and informal salaried to transit into 
unemployment. Table 5 shows a breakdown of the new unemployed by sector of origin   16
computed using original sector sizes and the estimated intensities to calculate flows. 
Surprisingly a large proportion of the unemployed actually were previously employed in 
the informal sectors (40% in Brazil and 50% in Mexico). This is especially acute in 
Argentina where unemployment hovered at 20% in recent years.  Overall, 60% of job 
destruction had its origin in the informal sector. This is very consistent with the finding in 
the industrialized countries that micro firms have very high rates of failure, and hence 
failed entrepreneurs and their informal salaried employees are likely to find themselves 
frequently unemployed. It is far less consistent with the sector being comprised of 
separated workers who cannot afford to be unemployed and who search for new jobs 
from the informal sector.   
 
More generally, the story is consistent across all three countries that informal 
salaried workers do not spend long in these jobs--durations are just over a year.  Further, 
Figure 3 suggests that durations decrease with age and education in Mexico and 
Argentina. This may reflect that young workers receive training in the sector, or are 
helping out their parents who frequently are the owner of the micro firm.  Later in life, 
the sector may serve more as a way-station to another job with attendant lower stays.  
Perhaps for the data considerations discussed earlier Brazil behaves differently, showing 
a leveling off at a higher level in middle age. 
 
V. Dynamics over the Business Cycle.  
 
Further insights into the role each sector plays can be extracted from the 
generating a series of transition matrices across time and following the adjustment 
process of the market across the business cycle.  In this section we examine the Mexican 
market from 1987-2001, a period that includes the celebrated peso crisis of 1995.  Figure 
5 first presents an overview of the variation of the share of the work force in 
unemployment, formality and informality. The evolution of the unemployment rate (the 
bar in figure 5) corresponds to the stylized facts about the macroeconomic evolution 
across the period. 
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Period 1 Recovery:   Recovering from a recession at the end of the late 80’s, through the 
first years of the 1990,  the unemployment rate declines to the very low 3% and hovers 
there until the beginning of 1992. 
 
Period 2: Appreciation of the peso, economic slow down and crisis:  The two years prior 
to the Peso crisis saw a slow but continuous increase in the unemployment rate.  This 
culminated in the sudden spike to a decade high of 8% during the 2
nd quarter of 1995 in 
the midst of the crisis.  
 
Period 3: Recovery:  A large devaluation of the peso and a strikingly rapid recovery of 
the economy returned the unemployment rate to its pre-crisis levels in a matter of 
months. 
 
a. Movements in employment shares. 
 
We begin looking first at the evolution of each sectors’ share of the labor market 
across the two recoveries and crises.  We use unemployment rates to help define broad 
periods of recovery and recession above.  What deserves mention immediately is that 
despite the magnitude of the 1995 shock,  the unemployment rate remained in the single 
digits and showed an extremely rapid recovery.  This is partly due to a 25% fall in the 
real wage engineered by holding nominal wages fixed and allowing the devaluation-
induced inflation to erode real magnitudes.  That said, the adjustments in prices were 
nowhere near sufficient to eliminate movements in quantities and these are manifest in 
the significant reallocation of workers across sectors.    
 
The share of the formal sector remained reasonably constant from 1987 to 1992 at 
around 53% of the labor force.  Thereafter, however, it began a slide to 48% on the eve of 
the crisis before bottoming out at 45%.  After the devaluation, it began a sharp recovery, 
almost regaining its earlier highs by 2001.  These movements are largely mirrored by the 
movement of unemployment from 3% in 1989 to 8% during the crisis and then again 
down to the lowest levels in the sample in 2001.  Consistent with Diamond and   18
Blanchard, OLF is clearly not simply discouraged unemployment since it moves opposite 
to unemployment in a strongly procyclical way, falling from 19% of the workforce to 
15% during the crisis before partially recovering to 17% in 2000.  In sum, the rise in 
unemployment could be accounted for easily by either the shift of workers from OLF into 
search, or the decrease in formal employment, but would be exceeded by the combination 
of both tendencies.  The informal sectors clearly play an important role in the adjustment. 
 
However, the movements in the informal sectors fit somewhat uncomfortably in a 
view of residual or disguised unemployment.  The sector saw a modest increase to 44% 
during the boom of the first period as unemployment fell-- like OLF, it behaves 
procyclically, most of the movement being driven by self employment.  However, 
coinciding with the increase in unemployment rates starting in 1993, it shifts to behaving 
counter cyclically and the sector expands to 46% on the eve of the crisis and then to 48% 
during the crisis, surpassing formal sector employment as the largest generator of 
employment.  The subsequent recovery of the economy was characterized by a similarly 
remarkable role reversal and by the end of 2001 relative shares almost at their 1989 
levels.   
 
In sum, the crisis period suggests a very traditional view of the behavior of the 
role of the informal sector as a shock absorber for the formal sector and perhaps a kind of 
disguised unemployment.  However, the procyclical movement in self employment’s 
share in the 1989-1991, and 1999-2001 recoveries suggests an important missing part of 
the story.  Further, we have no clear view of exactly how the workforce was reallocated 
among sectors and in particular whether the rise in the non formal sectors is due to job 
destruction in the formal sector or lack of job creation that left workers with nowhere to 
go.  Both issues are illuminated by looking into the patterns of transition among sectors.  
 
b. Duration over the business cycle 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the probability of movement from one sector 
to another can be broken down into average rates of turnover or rate of separation from a 
particular sector and then its propensity, conditional on that turnover, to move into that   19
sector.  We begin looking at the overall level of mobility in the labor market across the 
business cycle. 
 
Theory is  ambiguous on what patterns of duration we may see across the business 
cycle.  A view of a downturn as  a negative shock to the formal sector in the presence of 
wage rigidities may suggest a decline in duration during crises.  Symmetrically, if 
informal sector workers are effectively like disguised unemployed, rationed out of 
desired formal sector employment, we may expect duration in unemployment and 
informality to lengthen during recessions as the possibilities of transition to formal sector 
jobs decrease and queuing time increases.  On the other hand, if we consider informal 
employment as simply another alternative to formal employment, but one that is perhaps 
risky or plagued by credit restrictions, then we may be in a world closer to the quitting 
function literature (Bulow and Summers 1986, Phelps 1968, Salop 1979, Phelps and 
Hoon 1992).  Here, the increased opportunities in the alternate sector, or the greater 
likelihood of regaining a position in the formal sector in the event of business failure 
could lead to pro-cyclical quit rates out of formality accompanying more turnover in the 
informal sector as well.  Duration in OLF also depends some on whether it is considered 
discouraged unemployment, or voluntary idleness. 
 
Figure 6 suggests that duration in the formal sector is, in fact, strongly counter 
cyclical.  The recoveries in 1987-90 and 1997-2000, marked by decreasing 
unemployment and good macroeconomic conditions, saw significant decreases in 
duration in the formal sector.  Apart from the quarters immediately prior to the tequila 
crisis and the impact of the crisis itself the hazard rate of the formal sector decreased 
throughout the 90’s (duration increased).   
 
Strikingly, the evolution of duration of both the informal sectors is very similar to 
those of the formal sector (Figure 6) suggesting that the factors determining turnover (i.e: 
macroeconomic conditions dictating quitting or firing) affect all of them in a similar 
fashion.  Figure 7 suggests that duration in unemployment again is highly procyclical 
reflecting the ease of finding jobs during upturns. Duration in OLF is generally acyclical   20
although it decreases sharply during the crisis. This likely reflects the increase in search 
which manifests itself in the reduction in the size of the OLF sector and increase in the 
size of the unemployed sector.  Generally speaking, there is increased mobility 
throughout the matrix in recoveries, and a slowdown during recessions.  In the particular 
case of formal salaried work, the falling share of employment in formal salaried 
employment concomitant with this decreasing turnover suggests that the recession and 
subsequent crisis were characterized less by job destruction, than a decline in job 
creation.   
 
c. Intersectoral Flows 
 
Unemployment and Out of the Labor Force  
 
Paralleling the mainstream literature, we first follow the transitions between 
formal salaried employment and the two sectors of non employment: unemployment and 
out of the labor force. Figure 10 confirms our earlier intuition about the adjustment in the 
formal sector.   Transitions from the formal sector into unemployment rise after the initial 
recovery period, but then are fairly stable leading up to the crisis where they spike 
dramatically, but then fall immediately after to traditional levels. The major action, 
however, is in accessions to the sector from unemployment.  These slow down 
dramatically leading up to, bottom out during, and rapidly recover after, the crisis. 
 
  As  Flinn and Heckman (1982) concluded for the US, OLF has behavior clearly 
distinct from that of unemployment.  Movements between FS and OLF are highly 
symmetric and probabilities increase procyclically: workers do not enter OLF during 
recession and hence the sector is unlikely to be serving as discouraged unemployment.  In 
fact, since OLF turnover is largely acyclical, the movements are largely driven by 
changes in propensities: a given separation from the formal sector is less likely to lead to 
a movement to OLF in recession and the same is true for the reverse transition.   
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 Formality-Informality  
 
What is striking is how much more similar transitions between the formal and 
informal sectors are to OLF, than to unemployment.  Figure 8  shows that, as expected, 
we observe pro-cyclical transitions from informality to formality. However, again we 
find virtually and strikingly identical pro-cyclical transitions from formality to both 
informal sectors.  Also striking, but perhaps not surprising given the symmetry, is that 
most of movement in probabilities is driven by the overall level of mobility through the 
matrix and not generally to changes in specific changes in propensities to move among 
sectors, conditional on turnover (figure 9).  In the lead up to the crisis, propensities to 
move from formal to informal salaried work are largely constant across the period and 
those to self-employment show something of a return to mean after being unusually high 
during the boom of the early 1990s, and then a brief spike around the crisis. However, 
again, the movements are relatively subtle relative to the movements in the overall 
probabilities.  By contrast, there are very large movements of the propensities to move to 
unemployment from .13 to .3 and a decline into  OLF from .15 to .5.  Taken together, this 
implies that the key movements during the recession were emphatically not into the 
informal sector, but into unemployment.   
 
The view from self employment shows somewhat more variation, but still 
strikingly similar patterns.  There is an unusually high propensity of movement into 
formal employment during the boom of the first phase that mirrors the reverse movement 
from the formal sector.  This suggests that there was a particularly strong re-matching 
between these two sector during that recovery.  There is something of a decline going 
into the crisis and then a recovery again mirrored, although more weakly, in the reverse 
transition.  The largest offsetting movement in propensities is into unemployment, 
moving from .1 in 1989 to almost .2 on the eve of the crisis and then spiking at almost .3 
during the crisis. 
 
The informal salaried sector shows a similar pattern of declining propensity to 
enter formal work that is largely offset by an increase to unemployment of only slightly 
lower magnitudes compared to the other two sectors, and a secular increase to self   22
employment.  This secular increase is matched by a secular decrease in movement into 
formal employment and is matched by a complementary increase from self-employment 
into informal salaried work.   
 
The overall similarities in the behavior of patterns of job destruction among the 
three employment sectors are suggest in the transition probabilities to unemployment and 
self-employment plotted in figure 11.  In every case, movements into OLF follow the 
same procyclical pattern and movements into unemployment the  same, although in some 
cases noisier, counter cyclical pattern.  In sum, there is not evidence from either the Q or 
R matrices that the informal sector directly absorbed those displaced from the formal 
sector.  Consistent with the findings from the static picture of the previous sector, they 
contribute substantially to the increase in flows into unemployment.  In fact, the 
probability of moving into unemployment during the crisis is just below .05 from the 
formal sector, .08 from self employment and .17 from informal salaried work.  Job 
destruction was largest in the informal sector and accounts for the largest flows into 
unemployment during the crisis.   
 
The expansion of the self-employed sector, then is driven by two facts, both 
related to the lower hiring rates in the formal sector.  Direct movements to the formal 
sector from the other two is asymmetrically lower, as shown by the propensity matrices.  
Further, those who become unemployed had progressively lower propensities to enter 
formal employment, progressively higher access into informal salaried and  a similar but 
less pronounced trend into self employment.  The story of the period leading up to the 
crisis is one of disproportionately decreased access to the formal sector rather than job 




  This paper has sought to generate some stylized facts about LDC labor markets 
using a common methodology across three sets of panel data.  We estimate continuous 
time Markov processes for workers transitioning across three employment states,   23
unemployment, and being out of the labor force. Calculating intensities of movements 
(instantaneous probabilities), duration of stay, and propensities to transit among sectors 
conditional on separation, we first note a high degree of similarity among the three 
countries with Argentina’s very high unemployment rate likely to account for much of 
the difference.  
 
  We then compare rates of mobility as a potential measure of labor market 
flexibility.  As is the case in the stylized notions of the market, Argentina appears more 
rigid that the other two, even when controlling for important differences in the age and 
education of the work force.  However, disaggregating by sector suggests that formal 
sector turnover rates are roughly equal to those of Brazil and the apparent low mobility 
appears mostly due to much longer spells in unemployment.  
 
  We then parallel the mainstream literature in focusing on the roles played by the 
distinct sectors. We begin with the standard question about whether being out of the labor 
force is really discouraged unemployment or something distinct and then move on to a 
related although perhaps more relevant question in LDCs: the role of the large informal 
sector that is largely absent in the advanced.  The overarching query is whether these 
should be treated as also as disguised unemployment or, again as something different, in 
this case the something different being more of an unregulated microfirm sector.  The  
matrices suggest a kinship of this sector to that described in the US where entrants into 
the sector may be constrained in their accumulation of human and physical capital. 
Consistent with the US literature, those entering the sector are older (but not the oldest), 
and those working for them are among the youngest and most transitory. The high 
mortality rates found in any small firm sector may explain why the two informal sectors 
to flows into unemployment than the formal sector.   
  
We then study the patterns of transitions across a complete business cycle in 
Mexico that includes the celebrated peso crisis of 1995.  We find, first, that transitions 
among the three employed sectors and being out of the labor force are all highly 
symmetrical and procyclical.  The most dramatic evolution across the cycles is the   24
counter cyclical and very similar movement of turnover in all sectors.  An essential 
finding is that in both recoveries, and in particular, that from 1987-91, flows between the 
formal salaried and self-employed sectors expanded greatly and in favor of informal self 
employment yielding procyclical movements that are in contradiction to standard 
dualistic views of the sector.   
 
Where the patterns are more consistent with these views is in the lead up to the 
crisis and the crisis itself, although in a very particular way.  Job destruction was, in fact, 
highest in the informal sector and there is little evidence that the sector was directly 
absorbing displaced workers from the formal sector.  However, what accounts for an 
expansion of self employment across the period is that access to formal employment from 
both the other paid sectors and unemployment declined, leaving the informal sector to 
pick up the slack. 
 
As in the mainstream literature, being out of the labor force emerges as playing a 
distinct role from unemployment and we conjecture the outsized self employment sector 
is just that- analogous but larger.  Overall, the comovements of turnover and symmetries 
of movements suggest sectors that are relatively well integrated and not fundamentally 
distinct as desirable sources of employment, although the informal sectors do take up 
more slack in downturns.   
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Table 1: Sample Distribution Among Sectors for Different Age and Education Groups. 
  All  14-24  24-40  40-60  Low Education  High Education 
  Male  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Argentina                
                
OLF  20  52 48 66  3  42 11 51 17 60 23 48 
UNM  12  9 14  11  11 9 10 7 15 9 10 9 
SELF  21  10  5  3  23 12 31 14 20 11 21 10 
INF  13  9 16 8 14  11 9  9 16  12  10 8 
FOR  35  19 17 12 50 26 38 18 32  8  37 26 
  13,866 15,045 4,322 4,211 3,983 4,355 5,561 6,479 5,392 5,683 8,474 9,362 
Brazil               
               
OLF  16  56 24 55  2  50 20 64 16 63 14 41 
UNM  4  2 6 5 3 2 2 1 4 2 3 4 
SELF  20  11  9  5  24 15 28 13 21 12 18  9 
INF  15  10 18 11 13 11 12  9  14  8  16 15 
FOR  45  20 42 24 58 23 38 13 45 15 49 32 
  1,189,651 1,330,537 411,337 455,306 376,590 439,148 383,906 427,538 803,382 906,584 368,451 415,408
Mexico               
               
OLF  16  61 34 61  3  56 11 67 12 68 22 50 
UNM  4  2 5 4 2 2 3 1 4 2 3 3 
SELF  28  9  13  3  32 11 41 14 33 11 21  7 
INF  10  6 15  8 8 5 6 4  13  7 5 4 
FOR  42  21 33 24 54 26 40 14 38 13 48 36 
  809,754 975,075 283,627 319,009 267,331 337,356 258,796  318,710 481,680 611,718 328,004 363,306
 
  
Table 2: Posterior Probability of Embeddability Indexes various Ages. 
 
  Argentina Brazil  Mexico 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
        
All  0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14-24  0.78 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
24-40  0.38 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
40-60  0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Low Education  0.20 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
High Education  0.54 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 3a: Intensity Matrix, Duration and Propensity Matrix: Argentina 
Intensity Matrix  Males   Females 
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
OLF  -0.3411  0.2274 0.0101 0.0748 0.0287    -0.2718 0.1723 0.0427 0.0412 0.0155 
  0.0119  0.0128 0.0048 0.0089 0.0048    0.0065 0.0069 0.0031 0.0041 0.0020 
UNM  0.2162  -1.0844 0.2811 0.4086 0.1784    0.6866 -1.2904 0.1141 0.3553 0.1343 
  0.0158  0.0358 0.0191 0.0267 0.0145    0.0322 0.0446 0.0172 0.0275 0.0136 
SELF  0.0329 0.1519 -0.3772 0.1486 0.0439    0.2369 0.0997 -0.6248 0.2557 0.0325 
  0.0046  0.0099 0.0113 0.0097 0.0050    0.0158 0.0155 0.0223 0.0186 0.0062 
INF  0.0577  0.3515 0.2876 -0.8779 0.1810    0.2356 0.3190 0.2755 -0.9174 0.0873 
  0.0095  0.0237 0.0177 0.0281 0.0130    0.0216 0.0261 0.0191 0.0315 0.0101 
FOR  0.0072  0.0920 0.0272 0.0533 -0.1797    0.0247 0.0684 0.0224 0.0381 -0.1537 
  0.0020  0.0061 0.0032 0.0044 0.0056    0.0042 0.0066 0.0034 0.0049 0.0068 
Duration              
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
  2.9356  0.9232 2.6534 1.1403 5.5709    3.6818 0.7759 1.6026 1.0913 6.5208 
  0.1024  0.0302 0.0796 0.0365 0.1736    0.0881 0.0267 0.0573 0.0376 0.2906 
              
Propensity Matrix            
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
OLF    0.6666 0.0297 0.2194 0.0843      0.6339 0.1573 0.1517 0.0572 
    0.0282 0.0141 0.0249 0.0139      0.0174 0.0112 0.0151 0.0073 
UNM  0.1994    0.2593 0.3768 0.1645    0.5321    0.0885 0.2753 0.1041 
  0.0129   0.0161  0.0197  0.0128  0.0172  0.0133  0.0181  0.0101 
SELF  0.0872  0.4026  0.3939  0.1164  0.3792  0.1597  0.4091  0.0520 
  0.0121  0.0231  0.0222  0.0130  0.0220  0.0244  0.0247  0.0098 
INF  0.0658  0.4003 0.3277    0.2063    0.2569 0.3476 0.3003    0.0952 
  0.0108  0.0218  0.0179  0.0140  0.0225  0.0248  0.0178  0.0107 
FOR  0.0400  0.5119 0.1516 0.2965      0.1610 0.4453 0.1456 0.2481   
  0.0111  0.0282 0.0176 0.0235      0.0266 0.0374 0.0212 0.0299   
Standard Errors in italics below. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws    30
Table 3b: Intensity Matrix, Duration and Propensity Matrix: Brazil 
Intensity Matrix    M a l e s         F e m a l e s     
  OLF UNM SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF  INF  FOR 
OLF  -0.2823  0.0670 0.0402 0.1223 0.0528    -0.1938 0.0406 0.0743 0.0484 0.0304 
  0.0014  0.0011 0.0007 0.0011 0.0010    0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 
UNM  0.1855  -1.9475 0.3217 0.5413 0.8992    0.8444 -2.0680 0.1519 0.4055 0.6662 
  0.0043  0.0135 0.0054 0.0082 0.0089    0.0100 0.0160 0.0054 0.0086 0.0091 
SELF  0.0426 0.0397 -0.2900 0.1324 0.0752    0.4112 0.0148 -0.5923 0.1234 0.0428 
  0.0006  0.0009 0.0012 0.0011 0.0008    0.0022 0.0010 0.0025 0.0014 0.0010 
INF  0.0904  0.1065 0.1941 -0.7252 0.3342    0.2000 0.0705 0.1286 -0.7201 0.3210 
  0.0011  0.0018 0.0015 0.0027 0.0021    0.0018 0.0019 0.0015 0.0030 0.0021 
FOR  0.0219  0.0832 0.0471 0.0889 -0.2411    0.0730 0.0733 0.0207 0.1305 -0.2976 
  0.0003  0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 0.0009    0.0008 0.0011 0.0005 0.0010 0.0013 
              
Duration              
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
  3.5422  0.5135 3.4486 1.3789 4.1479    5.1611 0.4836 1.6884 1.3888 3.3600 
  0.0170  0.0036 0.0148 0.0051 0.0147    0.0174 0.0037 0.0072 0.0058 0.0142 
              
Propensity Matrix            
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
OLF    0.2374 0.1424 0.4330 0.1871      0.2097 0.3834 0.2498 0.1571 
    0.0038 0.0024 0.0035 0.0033      0.0023 0.0018 0.0020 0.0017 
UNM  0.0952    0.1652 0.2779 0.4617    0.4083    0.0735 0.1961 0.3221 
  0.0021   0.0026  0.0036  0.0035  0.0037  0.0025  0.0038  0.0036 
SELF  0.1470  0.1370  0.4565  0.2594  0.6943  0.0250  0.2084  0.0723 
  0.0018  0.0029  0.0031  0.0027  0.0022  0.0016  0.0022  0.0016 
INF  0.1247  0.1469 0.2676    0.4609    0.2777 0.0979 0.1786    0.4458 
  0.0014  0.0024  0.0019  0.0024  0.0024  0.0025  0.0020  0.0023 
FOR  0.0909  0.3451 0.1953 0.3687      0.2454 0.2464 0.0696 0.4386   
  0.0013  0.0029 0.0018 0.0025      0.0028 0.0034 0.0017 0.0028   
Standard Errors in italics below. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws   31
 
Table 3c: Intensity Matrix, Duration and Propensity Matrix: Mexico 
Intensity Matrix    Males         Females    
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
OLF  -0.3881  0.1486 0.0668 0.0962 0.0766    -0.1947  0.0547  0.0670  0.0393 0.0336 
  0.0021 0.0022  0.0013  0.0017  0.0013    0.0008 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 
UNM  0.5898 -1.9772  0.4076  0.4496  0.5303    1.3334 -2.1968 0.1197  0.2983  0.4455 
  0.0091 0.0172  0.0087  0.0102  0.0084    0.0153 0.0200 0.0060 0.0089 0.0084 
SELF  0.0443 0.0418 -0.3245 0.1506 0.0880    0.4510 0.0221  -0.6157  0.1091 0.0336 
  0.0007 0.0010  0.0014  0.0013  0.0009    0.0031 0.0015 0.0034 0.0019 0.0011 
INF  0.1045 0.1220  0.4274 -0.9778 0.3239    0.3499 0.0990 0.1767 -0.9080 0.2825 
  0.0021 0.0032  0.0036  0.0049  0.0030    0.0042 0.0034 0.0029 0.0054 0.0033 
FOR  0.0209 0.0473  0.0664  0.0602 -0.1948    0.0912 0.0364 0.0149 0.0561 -0.1987 
  0.0004 0.0007  0.0006  0.0007  0.0009    0.0009 0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 
                
Duration                
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
  2.5766 0.5058  3.0813  1.0227  5.1330    5.1374 0.4552 1.6241 1.1013 5.0329 
  0.0141 0.0044  0.0134  0.0051  0.0228    0.0215 0.0041 0.0088 0.0066 0.0268 
                
Propensity Matrix                
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR    OLF UNM SELF INF  FOR 
OLF    0.3828 0.1720 0.2478 0.1973      0.2812  0.3444  0.2019 0.1726 
    0.0049 0.0032 0.0041 0.0032      0.0030  0.0021  0.0022  0.0019 
UNM  0.2983   0.2061  0.2274  0.2682   0.6070  0.0545  0.1358  0.2028 
  0.0038   0.0041  0.0046  0.0037  0.0044  0.0027  0.0038  0.0034 
SELF  0.1364 0.1287    0.4639  0.2710    0.7324 0.0359    0.1771 0.0546 
  0.0021  0.0029    0.0032  0.0026  0.0032  0.0024  0.0028  0.0017 
INF  0.1069  0.1248  0.4371  0.3313  0.3853  0.1090  0.1946   0.3111 
  0.0022 0.0031  0.0029    0.0027    0.0042 0.0036 0.0030    0.0031 
FOR  0.1072 0.2426  0.3410  0.3092      0.4588 0.1834 0.0752 0.2826   
  0.0022 0.0035  0.0028  0.0031      0.0041 0.0038 0.0022 0.0034   
Standard Errors in italics below. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws   32
Table 4: Mobility Indexes various Ages. 
  Argentina Brazil  Mexico 
          
  Male   Female  Male   Female  Male   Female 
All  0.5724 0.6515 0.6973 0.7742 0.7724 0.8224 
  0.0111 0.0132 0.0057 0.0068 0.0037 0.0042 
14-24        
  0.7176 0.8033 0.8930 0.9608 0.8608 0.9240 
  0.0262 0.0403 0.0116 0.0132 0.0055 0.0064 
24-40        
  0.6515 0.7167 0.7383 0.7860 0.8129 0.8388 
  0.0273 0.0268 0.0110 0.0114 0.0080 0.0089 
40-60        
  0.5485 0.6153 0.6446 0.7742 0.7763 0.8554 
  0.0180 0.0195 0.0112 0.0209 0.0077 0.0115 
Low Education        
  0.5918 0.7165 0.7311 0.8419 0.8012 0.8783 
  0.0172 0.0239 0.0077 0.0104 0.0050 0.0068 
High Education        
  0.5655 0.6308 0.6478 0.7104 0.7774 0.8457 
  0.0140 0.0163 0.0089 0.0099 0.0059 0.0063 
Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws Standard Errors below 
 
Table 5: New Unemployed by Sector of Origin  
 
  Self-Employment  Informal Salaried  Formal Salaried 
Argentina  31% 35% 34% 
Brazil  15% 24% 61% 
Mexico  28% 22% 49% 
The results were computed using original sector sizes and the estimated intensities to 
calculate flows into unemployment   33
Table 6: Intensity Matrix, Duration and Propensity Matrix for Single Females: Argentina and Mexico 
Intensity Matrix    Argentina     Intensity Matrix    Mexico    
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR   OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR 
OLF  -0.356  0.2515 0.0115 0.0583  0.0348  OLF  -0.3188 0.1305 0.0347 0.0762 0.0774 
  0.0139  0.0156 0.0045 0.0092  0.0058    0.0021 0.0022 0.0008 0.0013 0.0012 
UNM  0.4661 -1.0855  0.0749  0.3596 0.1848  UNM  1.118 -2.0517  0.0978 0.305 0.5309 
  0.0382  0.0587 0.0204 0.0421  0.0244    0.0187 0.0253 0.0065 0.0123  0.012 
SELF  0.1352  0.1833 -0.7619 0.3634 0.08  SELF  0.2736  0.0475 -0.5897 0.1779 0.0908 
  0.0369 0.0516  0.0658  0.059  0.0253    0.0059 0.0045 0.0071 0.0052 0.0037 
INF  0.157 0.3946  0.1854  -0.8763  0.1393  INF  0.2914 0.1103 0.1156  -0.8887  0.3713 
  0.0312  0.0493 0.0287 0.0528  0.0234    0.0056 0.0053 0.0034 0.0075 0.0051 
FOR  0.0151 0.0969  0.021  0.0528 -0.1857  FOR  0.0703 0.0519 0.0148 0.0735 -0.2105 
  0.0069  0.0126 0.0061 0.0102  0.0123    0.0013 0.0014 0.0006 0.0013 0.0017 
                 
Duration          Duration       
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR   OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR 
  2.8136  0.9239 1.3223 1.1453  5.4076    3.1368  0.4875  1.696  1.1253  4.7498 
  0.1104 0.0497  0.1143  0.069  0.3622    0.0208 0.006 0.0205  0.0095 0.038 
                 
Propensity Matrix        Propensity Matrix      
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR   OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR 
OLF    0.7062 0.0323 0.1638  0.0977  OLF   0.4093  0.109  0.2391  0.2426 
    0.0305 0.0126 0.0258  0.0161      0.0054 0.0024 0.0039 0.0039 
UNM  0.4295   0.069  0.3311  0.1704 UNM  0.5449  0.0477  0.1486  0.2588 
  0.0286   0.0186  0.0322  0.021    0.0059  0.0031  0.0056  0.0052 
SELF  0.1775 0.2408    0.4766  0.105  SELF  0.4639 0.0805    0.3017 0.1539 
  0.0466  0.0655  0.0631  0.0325    0.0085 0.0076    0.008  0.006 
INF  0.1793 0.4501  0.2115    0.1591  INF  0.3279 0.1242 0.1301    0.4178 
  0.0345 0.0474  0.0295    0.0261    0.0057 0.0058 0.0037    0.0047 
FOR  0.081  0.5218 0.1129 0.2844    FOR  0.3341 0.2464 0.0703 0.3492   
  0.0369  0.0601 0.0322 0.0513      0.0058 0.0063 0.0029 0.0053   
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Figure 8 : Transitions between Formal Salaried, Informal Salaried and  Self-Employment 
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Figure 10: Transitions between Formal Salaried  and Unemployment and Out of the Labor Force 
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